



Conducting another informal press conference aboard yacht off Santa Catalina Island, Goldwater shouts 'Hi, Folks!' to passersby.

The DIFFICULTY of 'BEING FAIR' to GOLDWATER

by HEDLEY DONOVAN
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Barry Goldwater is about as controversial as presidential candidates come. Few people are neutral about him, and not many are just mildly pro or con. More than any other candidate since Franklin Roosevelt, he arouses intense and widespread scorn, alarm, devotion, worship. It took F.D.R. a couple of years in the White House to polarize the electorate; Goldwater has done it in his first run for the presidency.

It is not that the Goldwater personality has antagonized anybody. There is none of the slick or synthetic in him, and his rough-surfaced charm has made him friendships with some of the very people who are most appalled by the possibility that he might be President. Democratic senators like him as a man (he and John Kennedy were friends); so do the liberal Republican leaders whom he flattened at San Francisco.

It is Barry Goldwater's views, of course, that have made him so controversial. His views on domestic policy are not merely a break with Nixon-Eisenhower-Dewey-Willkie Republicanism. Goldwater is much more conservative than the late Robert Taft, and more conservative, in the context of 1964, than Alf Landon was in the context of 1936.

From this refreshingly unpompous politician, with his frank enjoyment of all the fun that Arizona and affluence can provide, with his engaging air of surprise at where he's got to, comes a truly bristling

doctrine. He charges Democrats, Republicans—the nation—with a sorry record of folly and timidity. He says that the trend of American political life and policy has been all wrong for at least a generation. He sees moral decay in public and private life and calls for a moral regeneration of Americans. He says we are fast surrendering our freedoms at home, and fast frittering away our chances of defending them from foreign danger.

But any brief, broad summation of Goldwater's point of view is bound to be challenged—by his admirers or his opponents, and

The inflamed areas of controversy

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sometimes by both. The statements made in the previous paragraph, for instance, may be regarded by some Goldwater supporters as exaggerating their man's conservatism, while some Goldwater critics may say that this summary credits him with a more coherent philosophy than he actually has.

This brings us to highly inflamed areas of controversy-within-controversy. More than any other major figure in U.S. politics, Goldwater has been dogged by disputes over whether he did in fact say this or that, and whether he did mean what somebody else says he meant.

In most presidential election years, there are one or two of those flaps that start when a candidate says something indiscreet or imprecise; the opposition pounces;

the original statement is then watered down or "clarified"; the opposition is accused of shameful misrepresentation, etc. But this year, on at least a dozen specific issues, there has been prolonged dispute over Goldwater's language and meaning, and some of these yes-he-did-no-he-didn't arguments have been even louder than the argument over the controversial views that he does unmistakably hold. The press has been accused of misquoting and misinterpreting him, and the fairness of the press has itself become something of a campaign issue.

There is indeed a problem of "fairness" here, for the press and the electorate. This article is an attempt at a fair summary of Goldwater's views on the major issues and a fair explanation of why it's difficult to draw up a summary.

As to the difficulties, there are

three big ones: the sheer bulk of Goldwater's speaking and writing; the almost total lack of any other kind of Goldwater "record" to check the words against; the particular intellectual make-up of the man himself.

His 3,000 speeches

Goldwater has talked a great deal, even by senatorial standards. He has made at least 3,000 formal speeches since he took his Senate seat in January 1953. More than half of these have been at Republican rallies and fund-raising dinners (Goldwater put in six years as Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee Chairman), but for several years Goldwater has been second only to the President as the most sought-after speaker in the country—on college campuses, on an endless circuit of forums, banquets and conventions.

He has, of course, given thousands of interviews and had countless quick exchanges with the press. Until some of his street-corner statements in New Hampshire stirred up such a furor early this year, Goldwater was extremely accessible to reporters. He has also been a part-time journalist himself, or at least a columnist (needless to say, not of the "Eastern Establishment" or "sensation-seeking" variety). His column "How Do You Stand, Sir?" ran three times a week from 1960 to early 1964 (in 140 papers at the peak).

Three political books have appeared under Goldwater's name: *The Conscience of a Conservative* (1960), *Why Not Victory?* (1962) and *Where I Stand*, published just last week. *Conscience* has sold three million copies, and the first print orders for *Where I Stand* are 1,100,000. All in all, Goldwater as a senator has probably written or spoken on the record 10 million words. That would be the equivalent of 100 average-size novels, or of all the articles and captions in 450 copies of *LIFE*. Even allowing for a great deal of repetitive material, it is a voluminous record—many times fatter than Lyndon Johnson's for the same years.

Goldwater has virtually no political record *except* those 10 million words (and of course his Senate roll-call votes). With most men who come anywhere near the presidential nomination, it is possible to tell a good deal about their real views by looking at their actual performance in various fields of public policy. This is true of big-state governors like Stevenson or Dewey; it was true of Nixon after

eight years' activity as Vice President; of Eisenhower on the basis of a decade of top military-diplomatic commands; and of influential legislators like Taft, Humphrey or Johnson. But Goldwater, even allowing for the fact that the Democrats have been in control of the Senate for 10 of his 12 years there, has been notably less active than many minority Senators in the drafting of bills, in committee work, in the negotiating and conciliating that creates—or tempers—legislation. He has been a very important political figure without being an important senator. In this respect he more nearly resembles John Kennedy than any other recent presidential candidate.

One of the very few examples of Goldwater "action" which is cited alongside his spoken record dates all the way back to the 1940s. Goldwater literature frequently refers to his having desegregated the Arizona Air National Guard when he was its chief of staff just after the war, and a few years later working for the desegregation of Phoenix municipal facilities, as a member of the city council. Goldwater critics have dug into these long-ago episodes and say that his role in both has been exaggerated.


Roots of confusion

But the greatest difficulty in arriving at a "fair" summary of Goldwater's views lies in the special quality of his thinking. During the New Hampshire primary campaign an angry Goldwater aide once snapped at a reporter, "Don't print what he says, print what he means." This is easier said than done.

There are many significant inconsistencies and contradictions in Goldwater's spoken record. Of course, the "fair" reporter or voter will grant that nobody—politician, clergyman, journalist or full professor of logic—could talk as much as Goldwater has without some contradictions. The fair-

A WORD ABOUT OUR

The words "conservative" and "liberal" are not very satisfactory as political labels (conserve what? liberal with what?), but nobody seems to come up with anything better. The terms are used in this article in the general sense that most voters use them: conservatives would leave to private initiative and responsibility many matters that liberals con-



When is the money drawn out of this

within controversy

minded student of the Goldwater record will also grant that a politician is entitled to some tactical adjustments of his positions as he moves from factional or sectional leadership to national stature within either the Republican or Democratic federation. Tactics apart, there is also the reality that people, politicians included, do often learn, grow and change their minds. [It was another Arizona Senator, the courtly Henry Ashurst of New Deal days, who called himself the "Dean of Inconsistency." When a constituent wrote to congratulate him on his stand on F.D.R.'s court-packing bill, Ashurst wrote back, "Dear Madam: Which stand?" Shortly before he died in 1962, Democrat Ashurst called Barry Goldwater "a splendid figure on the national scene."]

When all this is allowed for, it must still be said that on many issues there is genuine cause for confusion as to where Goldwater stands today, and that the confusion has been created chiefly by the Senator himself, not by unfriendly journalists.

Some of it arises because the Goldwater tongue lacks the censor mechanisms that most public men acquire fairly soon in their careers. There is also a certain casualness in Goldwater's approach to big philosophical propositions and big points of principle. These have a strong attraction for him, but he is chronically surprised at specific interpretations that his critics—and sometimes his friends—can read into his statements. Some of his boldest generalities remain just that because Goldwater himself has not related them with any precision to political context and a concrete policy choice. This may be because he has done so little of the legislating, negotiating or administering by which broad principles finally get applied to the troublesome specifics of public policy.

With his wide-ranging, undisciplined intelligence, Goldwater is

capable of serious homework when the details of an issue have somehow aroused his interest. In the middle and late 1950s, for instance, he was a formidable student of abuses of labor union power. Today he knows enough about the manned-bomber argument to give the redoubtable Mr. McNamara some uncomfortable moments. But these are exceptions to his general impatience with the elaborately documented or closely analytical approach to issues.

Sometimes he just can't be bothered at all. One liberal Republican was astounded to hear that several weeks after the San Francisco convention Goldwater said he really had no objection to the Romney amendments—on civil rights and extremism—to the Republican platform. Why, then, were the amendments crushed by the Goldwater troops on the convention floor? Because, admitted Goldwater, he had not read either amendment during the proceedings and in fact had not read the full platform until after the convention had adopted it.

College bored him

Goldwater has often said that the biggest mistake of his life was dropping out of college after his freshman year. (He is the first Republican candidate since Harding without a college degree.) The official biographies imply he was needed in the family department store. The Senator is more frank—college bored him.

Professor Russell Kirk (*The Conservative Mind*), a Goldwater admirer and occasional brain-truster, has written of his friend: "It would be a gross exaggeration to call him a man of books. . . he reads only in odd intervals of leisure. . . But what he reads he masters; and he has no time for trash." Kirk calls Goldwater an "ear-learner" who "formulates practical judgments chiefly upon the basis of conversations with men who, he has reason to believe, know what they are talking about."

Another friend of Goldwater's, a medium-liberal Republican who opposed his nomination, puts it differently: "Someone puts something in front of Goldwater, he reads it and likes it, and that's that." This Republican believes there is little "intellectual content" to Goldwater, but he has decided to support him and he tells Republicans who have not yet made their peace with the ticket: "You have to make up your mind on the basis of his character. He is hon-

est." With mingled fear and hope, he adds: "He can be led."

For most big political figures the speech-writer is a necessary technician. He may or may not have more literary facility than his patron, but he certainly has more time to write. His biggest thrill comes when he sells the boss not just some language but an idea. This is a thrill that has come quite often to Goldwater speech-writers.


The ghosts complicate any analysis of Goldwater's real views. The chief author of the eloquent and uncompromising San Francisco acceptance speech was the highly conservative Karl Hess. Goldwater professed not to see why there was such a fuss about the speech. Three weeks later, however, at the Republican "unity" conference at Hershey, Pa., Goldwater gave a very different speech which any moderate or liberal Republican could comfortably stand on. This speech was a joint literary effort (not eloquent) by Goldwater, Eisenhower, Edward McCabe, a former Eisenhower assistant who has

been working for Goldwater, and Bryce Harlow, a former Eisenhower speech-writer who still gives the General a hand now and then. But Goldwater, in talking with reporters afterward, said this speech also was pretty much what he had been saying all along, and furthermore that "this is no conciliatory speech at all."

Clearly enough, there can be no such thing as an absolutely "factual" or "objective" analysis of the Goldwater philosophy. The conscientious student of the Goldwater record will sometimes have to supply his own judgment of the Senator's essential meaning. What follows is LIFE's best understanding of Goldwater's position on a number of important issues.

The Cold War

Goldwater has been generally consistent in his over-all view of the confrontation between the free world and Communism. He takes a very hard line. Coexistence, if it implies that we are reconciled to



By whom? Which way?

POLITICAL LABELS

sider a government concern; if government involvement is unavoidable, conservatives would limit it more than liberals would, and would be more likely to see it as a state or local function, rather than federal. Goldwater is proud to identify himself as a conservative, and once amiably suggested that he doesn't mind being called an "arch conservative."



can't
help
being
what
they
are...

there would always be men in her life...all kinds of men...
and always Philip to come back to...to degrade and despise.

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Hard support for a tough foreign policy

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the present boundaries and powers of Communism, is dangerous as well as dishonorable. It would eventually confront the U.S. with a choice between surrender and all-out nuclear exchange.

The U.S. must resolve to win the Cold War; victory would be "the reduction of Communist power to a level from which it cannot threaten the security of our nation or the peace of the world." This can be brought about without war if it is clear that we are willing to risk war, and if we keep up our military strength and maintain firm diplomatic, economic and propaganda pressure against the Communist world. This is the only way to peace—"peace through strength."

Goldwater is not impressed by arguments that Russia is changing, or that Communism is evolving along lines less dangerous to the U.S. The U.S. "can take no comfort" from the Russia-China split or the various disputes between Russia and the European satellites; all of them are still Communists bent on our burial. He has opposed U.S. aid to Poland and Yugoslavia, and the 1963 wheat deal with Khrushchev. He has opposed cultural exchanges with Russia and any kind of disarmament negotiations, and has been skeptical of summitry. He was one of 19 senators who opposed the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty: "I do not vote against the hope of peace but only against the illusion of it. I do not vote for war, but for the strength to prevent it."

In recent months, and most notably at Hershey, Pa., Goldwater has had much praise for the "Eisenhower-Dulles" foreign policy. From his whole record, however, it seems fair to say that he really admires only one side of that policy—the tough side that showed in Ike's stands in Lebanon, Quemoy-Matsu, Berlin. The other side of the Eisenhower-Dulles conduct of the Cold War was the probing for possibilities of limited agreements with the Russians. Goldwater considers this appeasement.

Recognition of Russia

Goldwater has said: "My disagreement with diplomatic recognition of Russia goes back to the day when we did it in the 1930s." Also: "Our entire approach to the Cold War would change for the better the moment we announced that the United States does not

regard Mr. Khrushchev's murderous clique as the legitimate ruler of the Russian people or of any other people." He has also said that of course the President would have to consult with the Senate before withdrawing recognition, which is not correct; he later said he would consult senators anyway and also our allies. His present position seems to be that the threat of withdrawing recognition should be used as a tool for getting concessions from Russia.

United Nations

Goldwater has moved around considerably in his attitude toward the U.N. In *Conscience of a Conservative* he noted that the U.N. is in part a Communist organization and that its policies were necessarily "the product of many different views—some of them friendly, some of them indifferent to our interests, some of them mortally hostile." He feared that our involvement in the U.N. "may be leading to an unconstitutional surrender of American sovereignty." But U.S. withdrawal "is probably not the answer to these problems."

In 1961, however, disgusted by U.N. policies in the Congo and its failure to condemn India's invasion of Goa, he came to the "reluctant conclusion" that the U.S. should get out. "I leaned over backward to be charitable to that organization." In 1962 he said, "The idea was wonderful but the world is not ready for it." In May 1963: "Frankly, I think the fact that it is proven to be unworkable is grounds enough for us to quit wasting our money on it."

He abandoned this position about a year ago. In a LIFE article of Jan. 17, 1964, "My Proposals for a 'Can-Win' Foreign Policy," which he often cites as the best summary of his views on foreign affairs, he called the U.N. "at best a secondary instrument of international accord." He thought it was moderately "useful" as a forum for discussing Communist violations of the U.N. charter, but dangerous if it becomes "an excuse for not driving hard bargains with the Communists" and if Americans come to look upon it as a major force for peace.

As the campaign year has progressed, he has spoken somewhat more warmly of possible values and opportunities in U.S. membership, expressed indignation at opponents who say he wants the U.S. to get out, and at the same time indicated there is a lot wrong

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Doubts about 'missiles in our silos'

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with the U.N. today. At Hershey, Pa. in August he said:

"Let me reiterate here what I have said also in every corner of the land in this campaign—that I support unconditionally the purposes the United Nations was originally intended to serve; that I believe we must make the fullest possible use of the United Nations and work hard to improve it and that while the U.N. was never designed to be a substitute for a clear and resolute United States foreign policy, we must take all reasonable steps to help the U.N. become a more effective instrument for peace among nations."

This seems to be his position today.

NATO

In *Conscience*, Goldwater thought the U.S. overestimated the value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and alliances in general. "The alliance system is completely defensive in nature and outlook. [This fact, in the light of the Communists' dynamic, offensive strategy, ultimately dooms it to failure.]"

Along about 1962, however, he became a NATO booster and has remained so. Goldwater has become increasingly emphatic in his enthusiasm for NATO, and he argues forcefully that the Kennedy-Johnson administration has allowed the alliance to fall into "disarray." At Hershey he called NATO "the greatest peacekeeping force ever devised." He believes we should have helped De Gaulle develop nuclear weapons for France. He proposes that "all NATO forces stationed in Europe, regardless of nationality, should be equipped with and trained in the use of nuclear weapons, particularly of the so-called battlefield or tactical variety." He fears that the U.S. sometimes looks friendlier to Russia than to our own allies, and has promised that as President he would let the NATO countries "hook into our hot line, either directly or by diplomatic process."

Cuba

"The suggestion that we must either accept Communism in Cuba or invade Cuba is defeatist and dangerous nonsense," Goldwater says. When Kennedy blockaded Cuba during the missile crisis of October 1962, "we briefly experienced the psychological advantages that

accrue to firm action," but then "all too quickly . . . we went back to the morale-enfeebling course of hat-in-hand diplomacy."

He believes we should re-impose the blockade; give military training and equipment to Cuban exiles; unify the various Cuban refugee committees and organizations into a single Cuban government-in-exile, and give it diplomatic recognition. ("All this should be done in conjunction with the Organization of American States.") Then we should support "from the air" and "with supplies and equipment" any movement the government-in-exile might launch to overthrow the Castro regime.

When Castro shut off the water supply to Guantanamo last February, Goldwater was fed up. "I hope our President will have the courage to tell Castro to turn that water back on . . . we ought to tell him turn it on or the marines are going to turn it on for you and keep it on."

Vietnam

Until about six months ago Goldwater had no serious criticism of Administration policy in Vietnam; as late as February he said Johnson seemed to be doing pretty well with the problem. It became an important theme in Goldwater speeches soon after Karl Hess joined his staff in March, and it is now one of his favorite illustrations for the charge that this Administration pursues a "no-win" foreign policy. In his acceptance speech he said, "We are at war in Vietnam. Yet the President, who is the Commander in Chief of our forces, refuses to say whether or not the objective is victory." Goldwater advocates "threatening or actually interdicting" the Vietcong supply routes from Red China, Laos and Cambodia and believes this can be done without bombing North Vietnamese cities. "Nowhere in the world today is there a clearer road to peace through strength than in Vietnam."

An erroneous Associated Press report of a Goldwater TV interview in May had him advocating the use of nuclear weapons to "defoliate" jungle growth that conceals the Vietcong supply lines. He had actually mentioned this as something that "could well be done," while making it fairly (not absolutely) clear he wasn't proposing it.

He mused out loud with more startling effect, in a press conference on the yacht *Sundance* on August 26, saying: "Any President should always be interested in negotiating—that's the way you

and wars." A surprised reporter asked if, as President, Goldwater would be willing to sit down with Red China. "I think that's the way you have to do it," Goldwater said. "I've thought for some time that talks with the Red Chinese might be profitable."

A few hours later Goldwater's press secretary, Paul Wagner, explained: "It had been suggested [to Goldwater] by military people and some civilian experts that when we get our military position over there clarified—strengthened—then we come in contact with the Red Chinese and tell them we are in a position to cut off the supply lines. If they didn't stop, then you would blow up a bridge or show some other sort of force to demonstrate our intention. So when Goldwater was speaking of 'negotiation,' it was in the sense that you tell them what you're going to do if they don't stop. The Senator said, 'I'm not recommending this, but it might not be an impossible idea.'"

Foreign Aid and Trade

He has voted against foreign aid every time he has had a chance—and he has had many chances in his two terms in the Senate. Goldwater has described foreign aid as "ill-conceived, ill-administered, characterized by waste and extravagance," a drain on the U.S. taxpayer and U.S. economy. "It has created a vast reservoir of anti-Americanism among proud peoples who . . . resent dependence on a foreign dole" (1960).

"If we have to live with foreign aid," he said in 1963, it should not be scattered around among 90-odd countries, but "used as a rifle" aimed at specific areas where we can gain advantage over the Russians."

In 1964 he has said that foreign military aid and technical assistance to resolutely anti-Communist countries can be "valuable adjuncts to our over-all program of mutual security," but straight economic aid as presently administered is "too often a crutch . . . something bordering on global welfarism . . ."

As to foreign trade, Goldwater declares himself a free trader in principle, but his voting record has been generally "protectionist."

He voted in 1955 to keep three protectionist provisions in the Reciprocal Trade Act, and in 1958 opposed a four-year extension of the act. When the Kennedy foreign trade liberalization bill came before the Senate in 1962, he supported amendments to limit the program to three years (instead of



Veteran Goldwater talked national defense to V.F.W. audience in Cleveland.

five) and to incorporate "peril point" procedures on the measures; these amendments failing, he voted against the bill.

Defense, Nuclear Control

In the 1960 campaign Goldwater was indignant at "the absurd charge . . . made by Mr. Kennedy and others that America had become—or was in danger of becoming—a second-rate military power." He was satisfied that U.S. military power was vastly superior to the Soviet, and that "our advantage promises to be a permanent part of U.S.-Soviet relations for the foreseeable future." He questioned the good faith of Democrats suggesting otherwise.

This year Goldwater argues that Kennedy-Johnson-McNamara policies are gravely jeopardizing the U.S. military advantage. He is usually careful to say that U.S. power (inherited from the Eisenhower administration) is still much greater than Russia's, but he leaves some question as to the present value of all this power in view of his low opinion of its civilian bosses, McNamara and Johnson. After the Tonkin Gulf action in August, he said, "The Administration has shown little skill when negotiating with the Communists. Now it appears they have as little skill when fighting with the Communists." McNamara, whom he had called only two years ago "one of the best Secretaries of Defense ever—an IBM machine with legs," is now accused of disastrous misjudgments and gross duplicity. He charges McNamara-Johnson with a policy of "planned weakness" because they are not bringing along a new manned bomber, to succeed the B-47, B-52 and B-58. When these planes are obsolete, by the early 1970s, "our deliverable nuclear capacity may be cut down by 90%." He has questioned the "reliability" of "the missiles in our silos." With its "utter disregard for new weapons" the Administration

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'A mood of easy morals in our land'

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is skimping on all kinds of military research and development work and has failed to introduce "a single new strategic weapon system." And "Field Marshal McNamara" is constantly "downgrading the armed services, ignoring professional military advice."

In his formal campaign kickoff speech at Prescott, Ariz., Sept. 3, Goldwater promised that as President he would end the draft "as soon as possible."

He has not said whether he thinks over-all defense spending should be increased, or if not, which existing military programs he would cut down in order to find money for the weapon developments that he considers neglected.

He has said that NATO forces in Europe would be at a hopeless disadvantage if their commander had to check with Washington before he could tell his troops to use their tactical nuclear weapons. He thinks the NATO supreme commander should be able to use these weapons at his own discretion (although he has sometimes said "commanders" in the plural). He thinks his point would be better understood if we thought of low-yield nuclear devices for battlefield use as "conventional" weapons, "no more powerful than the firepower you [Veterans of Foreign Wars] have faced on the battlefield."

Statism and Freedom

In his own Senatorial campaign in 1952, Goldwater sounded like a fairly conventional Republican. In the Senate, however, he took up increasingly conservative positions. In a memorable floor speech in 1957, he denounced the "abominably high" budget Eisenhower had brought in. Goldwater had now formed a rigorously conservative philosophy, and it was given impressive expression in 1960 in *The Conscience of a Conservative*. Goldwater has credited Brent Bollinger, a *National Review* editor, with being the book's "guiding hand," but the book is consistent with the Senator's speeches and voting positions for several years previous to its publication. The heart of this famous tract is the proposition that Americans have been surrendering their God-given individual freedoms, not to tyrants but to the "gentler collectivists" who promote the welfare state.

"The turn will come" when America elects a man "who will proclaim in a campaign speech: 'I have little interest in streamlining

government or in making it more efficient, for I mean to reduce its size. I do not undertake to promote welfare, for I propose to extend freedom. My aim is not to pass laws, but to repeal them. It is not to inaugurate new programs, but to cancel old ones that do violence to the Constitution . . . or that impose on the people an unwarranted financial burden . . .'"

Goldwater has since reversed several of his stands on specific issues in *Conscience*. (One of his staff men said during the California primary campaign: "We've been trying to forget that book ever since it first came out.") But the general point of view the book expresses is never very far below the surface. "Our people," he said at the Convention in San Francisco, "have followed false prophets . . . those who seek to live your lives for you, to take your liberties in return for relieving you of your responsibilities—those who elevate the state and downgrade the citizen."

But he also promises that he would not dismantle the welfare state overnight. He has said: "We must proceed with care in our task of cutting the Government down to size. Honesty requires that we honor the commitments Government has made to all areas of the economy, whether explicit or implicit. . . . But there are some things we can do at once. We can start at once to slow down the expansion in federal spending. . . ."

Arizona Welfare

For his home state Goldwater has made some exceptions to his general hostility to Big Government. In the late 1950s he pushed legislation to subsidize the domestic prices of zinc and lead and keep government copper stockpiles off the market. He and his venerable Democratic colleague Carl Hayden, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, are co-sponsors of the "Central Arizona Project" bill, authorizing a \$1.5 billion irrigation and power scheme.

Moral Decline

In Goldwater's view, it is not just that the welfare state encroaches on Americans' freedoms; freedom and responsibility are inseparable and Big Government, by promising to look after so many of the individual's problems, saps the individual's sense of responsibility for his own acts. Like old-time Socialists who blamed prostitution, drunkenness and other "social evils" on the System, i.e., capital-

ism, Goldwater blames the present system, i.e., the welfare state, for much that is wrong in America's "private" morality. On the subject of morality he is the sternest presidential candidate that Americans have listened to in a long time.

In San Francisco in July, he said: "Rather than useful jobs in our country, people have been offered bureaucratic make-work; rather than moral leadership, they have been given bread and circuses; they have been given spectacles, and, yes, they've even been given scandals. Tonight . . . there is aimlessness among our youth, anxiety among our elderly, and there is a virtual despair among the many who look beyond material success toward the inner meaning of their lives."

In August at the Illinois State Fair, Goldwater gave a stiff sermon on the connection between public and private morality. "There is something distinctly wrong when common honesty and familiar morality are openly and widely challenged by the doctrine of the fast buck and the code of the off-color novel. There is something wrong when the standards of drama and literature seek new depths rather than new heights; when pornography becomes a measure of talent."

The use of positions of public power "to feed private greed and gain" sets the stage for other kinds of lawlessness: "for the cynical disregard of ordinary honesty in our every-day lives, for the petty thefts that plague our stores and industries, for the hoaxes and swindles that plague our consumers. I don't have to quote statistics for you to understand what I mean. You know. You have to face it every day on the front page or the back page of your paper. Every wife and mother—yes, every woman—knows what I mean. There is a mood of easy morals and uneasy ethics that is an aching truth in our land. And no one in a position to set the examples that might set this right, can avoid responsibility for what is wrong. Let me put it this way: there should be no skeletons in the closets of any part of the federal structure, and that goes for the smallest agency right up to the White House itself."

Law and Order

At Prescott: "It is on our streets that we see the final, terrible proof of a sickness which not all the social theories of a thousand social experiments has even begun to touch. . . . Crime grows faster than population, while those who break the law are accorded more

consideration than those who try to enforce the law. Law enforcement agencies—the police, the sheriffs, the FBI—are attacked for doing their jobs. Lawbreakers are defended. . . . We have the appalling spectacle of this country's ambassador to the United Nations actually telling an audience—this year, at Colby College—that 'in the great struggle to advance civil and human rights, even a jail sentence is no longer a dishonor but a proud achievement.'"

It is in his stress on this issue, of course, that Goldwater is accused of cultivating the "backlash" vote, not just the southern opponents of civil rights legislation but those Northerners, many of them normally Democratic, who feel the Negro is "going too far." Goldwater's recent references to violence and lawlessness have seldom been so worded as to call to mind crime or terror against the Negro in the South; the emphasis is plainly on disorder in the northern cities.

"Tonight there is violence in our streets," he said in San Francisco. "The growing menace in our country tonight, to personal safety, to life, to limb and property, in homes, in churches, on the playgrounds, particularly in our great cities, is the mounting concern or should be of every thoughtful citizen. Security from domestic violence, no less than from foreign aggression is the most elementary and fundamental purpose of any government. . . ."

To those critics who saw a contradiction between a presidential concern over local law and order, and the same candidate's fear of federal encroachment on local government, Goldwater said at Prescott: "It is a responsibility of the national leadership to make sure that it and its spokesmen and its supporters do not discourage the enforcement or incite the breaching of these [local] laws."

Civil Rights

In *Conscience*, Goldwater said the federal government was clearly obliged to protect the Negro's right to vote. But it was not required to force the states "to maintain racially mixed schools."

A year or two ago, however, Denison Kitchel, the able Phoenix lawyer who is Goldwater's closest friend and adviser, convinced him that the Supreme Court decision was sound, and Goldwater began to criticize Attorney General Kennedy for not fully utilizing available enforcement "machinery."

When the 1964 civil rights bill came to a vote, Goldwater was one of 27 senators (and only six Republicans) who opposed it. He argued that there was no constitutional ground for the "public

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© 1964, Hershey

First you've got to get his attention!

For the woman who dares to be different

The big switch on Social Security

GOLDWATER
CONTINUED

accommodations" or "fair employment" provisions. After the bill was passed, he told the Republican Platform Committee at San Francisco that, as President, he would of course enforce the law, and that the Supreme Court would determine the constitutionality of the two titles he had objected to.

Goldwater has said many times that he personally abhors racial discrimination, but "the trouble is essentially moral in nature, and we have had ample experience to show us that it is impossible to legislate moral conduct"—"There's no law that can be passed that can make you like me or me like you." He has called the 1964 law "a \$3 bill—a phony" and also speculated: "If they could have locked the doors to the Senate and turned the lights off, you wouldn't have gotten 25 votes."

'Extremism'

As a freshman senator, Goldwater made an impassioned defense of Joe McCarthy during the famous "censure" debate of 1954. After McCarthy's death in 1957, he told a Wisconsin Republican audience: "Because Joe McCarthy lived, we are a safer, freer, more vigilant nation today . . . he made a contribution . . . that will forever redound to the credit of the people of Wisconsin and to your Republican organization."

Robert Welch, leader of the John Birch Society, raised money for Goldwater's 1958 Senate campaign, and various far-out right-wing groups talked of Goldwater for President in 1960.

Goldwater has consistently refused to denounce the Birch Society ("I am impressed by the type of people in it"), though he thinks that leader Welch's book, *The Politician*, containing the notorious statement that Eisenhower was a conscious tool of the Communist conspiracy, is full of nonsense.

At San Francisco came the Senator's celebrated statement, "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice . . ." (Goldwater's underlining). He later said he particularly liked that part of the speech. At Hershey, Pa., however, he said: "Let me reiterate what I have said over and over in this campaign: I seek the support of no extremist—of the Left or the Right."

He has not said it "over and over" and he has not reconciled

the two statements. Hershey was a tactical concession to the Republican moderates; San Francisco was closer to the Senator's real view—that many of the far-right groups that are attacked as "extremist" are perfectly legitimate, indeed commendable, patriotic movements. He doesn't necessarily agree with all their positions—they are much more preoccupied, for instance, with alleged Communist influences inside the U.S. Goldwater has said very little about this in the past year or two; he is much more concerned about "respectable" Democratic and liberal Republican sponsorship of measures he considers collectivist.

Social Security

Goldwater has made a big switch here. In a television interview in January 1963, he said he had advocated "time and again" that Social Security should be a voluntary program. In an article for the *New York Times* last November, he wrote: "I think Social Security should be voluntary. This is the only definite position I have on it. If a man wants it, fine. If he does not want it, he can provide his own." On January 22, 1964: "I think we would be better off with Social Security as a voluntary set-up. Many people can buy better policies today in private companies than the Government can provide."

Since the essence of the Social Security system is that it is *not* voluntary, Nelson Rockefeller and his people hammered away with the charge that Goldwater would "destroy" the Social Security system. Goldwater began to shift ground. By February 19, he was saying: "I don't know where this voluntary business crept in."

Since New Hampshire he has not returned to the "voluntary business." At the Hershey unity meeting last month, he said: "And let me also repeat—for perhaps the one millionth time, lest there be any doubt in anyone's mind—that I support the Social Security system and I want to see it strengthened." Goldwater, however, has been consistent in his opposition to the financing of medical care for the aged through Social Security. He has said it would lead to "socialized medicine," and that it could "bankrupt" the Social Security system.

On September 2 he voted against the Administration medicare bill (as did all but five Republican senators), saying it would transform

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A tax cut—after 'the spending spree'

GOLDWATER CONTINUED

Social Security from a pension system into a "public relief or charity" program and that it rested on an "unspoken premise"—that the American people cannot be trusted to spend their own money sensibly.

Farm Policy

In *Conscience*, Goldwater said the government had no business concerning itself with agriculture at all, and in particular, that the federal price-support programs were "absurd and self-defeating." In what little he has had to say about it recently, he has edged off from the strict free-market approach, and now advocates a "voluntary" price-support system.

Income Tax

One sloppy or malicious charge against Goldwater has him "even" advocating repeal of the income tax. He has never done so.

He did once advocate (in *Conscience*) repeal of the progressive rate structure, arguing that "government has a right to claim an equal percentage of each man's wealth, and no more. . . . I do not believe in punishing success. . . . the graduated tax is a confiscatory tax. Its effect . . . is to redistribute the nation's wealth."

By 1963 he had watered down this position, commenting that it "wouldn't work" simply to eliminate the whole rate structure above the basic 20% bracket and make no other changes in the tax system. But he did say that elimination "or a drastic cutting" of the progressive features of the income tax should be part of a whole tax reform "package" and pointed out that the "progressive rate doesn't produce the amount of income people think it does."

In February 1964, however, when the Kennedy-Johnson tax "package," including considerable amelioration of the progressive rates, came to the Senate floor, Goldwater voted against it. He considered the tax cut "dangerously inflationary" at a time when "there is no corresponding cut in government spending, but instead, the announced prospect of continued deficit spending."

In June he said that as President, "One of my first priority tasks would be to secure a complete overhaul of our present federal tax code, so that we might quickly achieve the reforms which are so long overdue." At Los Angeles last week he said that as soon as federal spending was "held in check" he would cut individual and corporate income taxes by 5% a year for five years, also balancing the budget and "even" reducing the national debt—all this from natural growth of the economy, once the Democrats' "wild spending spree" is halted and private enterprise is freed from bureaucratic restraints.

Labor

Goldwater executed a strategic withdrawal on the "right-to-work" issue, or "voluntary unionism," as he now prefers to call it. In 1958 he introduced a bill which would have outlawed the union shop (compulsory union membership after hiring). By 1963, however, he was saying that he would "never vote for a so-called national right-to-work law." His present position is that there should be a national law making the union shop illegal except in states which have legislation specifically permitting it. (Two states now have such laws.)

Goldwater has consistently opposed increases in the minimum wage. "Whether we like it or not, there are people in this country

who cannot earn more than a dollar an hour because their productivity is not worth more than a dollar." It is not "a great humanitarian act" to try to repeal such facts of life but "a further rape of the Constitution and states' rights."

Poverty

Goldwater feels that relief for the poor should be handled mainly by families, private charities, and the churches, with their efforts supplemented by local government. He opposes matching federal payments to local relief programs, believes any form of governmental welfare payments is demeaning, but less so if the recipients are required to work for them.

Before the Economic Club of New York in January, he said: "It is my chore to ask you to consider the toughest proposition ever faced by believers in the free-enterprise system; the need for a frontal attack against . . . the Santa Claus of the free lunch, the Government handout, the Santa Claus of something-for-nothing and something-for-everyone." Government relief programs do not end poverty but "institutionalize" it. "As our production and income levels have moved up over a hundred years, our concepts of what is poor have moved up also. . . . There will always be a lowest one-third or one-fifth. . . ."

Being 'Fair': A Summary

This, then, is Barry Goldwater's record—through his Sept. 8 speech to 53,000 listeners at Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles (*below*). In the seven weeks of campaigning that remain, he may shift some of his stands (as he has done—e.g., labor and farm policy, U.N.); he may leave some positions unclear (as is now notably the case with "extremism"); he may open brand-

new issues. He will have to react to Democratic charges and he and Johnson will both have to react to foreign news.

But to the extent that Goldwater can control the dialogue, it seems likely that he will bear down hardest on "moral decline" and "law and order." He will of course continue to propound a highly conservative version of the free-enterprise philosophy. But the old bread-and-butter issues of domestic economic policy are difficult for him to do much with, not just because he has changed his stance on some specifics, like Social Security, but because he is up against such a high level of prosperity. His tough views on foreign policy and preparedness are very close to his heart, and he will certainly keep up heavy attacks in these areas. But some of his advisers feel it would be risky to make these the central themes of his campaign, that no matter how earnestly he insists he seeks *peace* through strength, the more he talks about nuclear devices, missiles, bombers, blockades, guerrilla supply lines, etc., the more he reinforces Democratic charges that he is "trigger-happy." He and his staff are agreed, however, that the "moral issue" might just be one of those imponderables that sometimes swing elections. They believe the feeling runs "deep down" in America that "something is wrong" in the national morality. And Goldwater admirers feel this issue is ideally suited to the character and personality of their candidate "projects."

The themes narrow as any presidential campaign approaches its climax; it often seems that only one or two issues are involved. Then, after Inauguration Day, the President of the U.S. must deal with the whole wide spectrum of public policy. LIFE has tried to give a fair recital of the views that Barry Goldwater would bring to such a task. On the editorial page, during the next few weeks, LIFE will state its opinion of these views.

